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ABSTRACT
Recent work has demonstrated robust mechanisms by which attacks can be or-
chestrated on machine learning models. In contrast to adversarial examples, back-
door or trojan attacks embed surgically modified samples with targeted labels in
the model training process to cause the targeted model to learn to misclassify
chosen samples in the presence of specific triggers, while keeping the model per-
formance stable across other nominal samples. However, current published re-
search on trojan attacks mainly focuses on classification problems, which ignores
sequential dependency between inputs. In this paper, we propose methods to dis-
creetly introduce and exploit novel backdoor attacks within a sequential decision-
making agent, such as a reinforcement learning agent, by training multiple benign
and malicious policies within a single long short-term memory (LSTM) network.
We demonstrate the effectiveness as well as the damaging impact of such attacks
through initial outcomes generated from our approach, employed on grid-world
environments. We also provide evidence as well as intuition on how the trojan
trigger and malicious policy is activated. Challenges with network size and unin-
tentional triggers are identified and analogies with adversarial examples are also
discussed. In the end, we propose potential approaches to defend against or serve
as early detection for such attacks. Results of our work can also be extended to
many applications of LSTM and recurrent networks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Current research has demonstrated different categories of attacks on neural networks and other su-
pervised learning approaches. Majority of them can be categorized as: (1) inference-time attacks,
which add adversarial perturbations digitally or patches physically to the test samples and make the
model misclassify them Goodfellow et al. (2015); Szegedy et al. (2013) or (2) poisoning attacks,
which, on the other hand, corrupt training data and in case of trojans, embed carefully designed
samples in the model training process to cause the model to learn incorrectly with regard to only
those samples, while keeping the training performance of the model stable across other nominal
samples Gu et al. (2017); Liu et al. (2017a). The focus of this paper is on trojan attacks. In these
attacks, the adversary designs appropriate triggers that can be used to elicit unexpected and unantic-
ipated behavior from a seemingly honest model. As demonstrated in Gu et al. (2017), such triggers
can lead to dangerous behaviors by artificial intelligence (AI) systems like autonomous cars by de-
liberately misleading their perception modules into classifying Stop signs as Speed Limit signs.
Most research on trojan attacks in AI mainly focuses on classification problems, where model’s
performance is affected only in the instant when a trojan trigger is present. In this work, we bring
to light a new trojan threat in which a trigger needs to only appear for a very short period and it
can affect the model’s performance even without the need to reappear in model’s inputs later. For
example, the adversary needs to only present the trigger in one frame of an autonomous vehicle’s
sensor inputs and the behavior of the vehicle can be made to change permanently from thereon.
Specifically, we utilize a sequential decision-making formulation for the design of this type of threat
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and we conjecture that this threat applies to many applications of LSTM networks and is potentially
more damaging in impact.
This work extends existing knowledge by providing: (1) a threat model and formulation for a new
type of trojan attack for LSTM networks and sequential decision-making agents, (2) implementa-
tion and experimental results illustrating the threat, and (3) analysis of models with the threat and
potential defense mechanisms.
The organization of the paper is as follow: Section 2 provides examples of related work. Section 3
provides relevant background on deep reinforcement learning and LSTM networks. Section 4 de-
scribes the threat model in greater detail. Section 5 shows the implementation details, algorithms,
experimental results, and identifies analogies with other adversarial attacks. Section 6 provides ex-
amples of approaches for defending against such attacks. Finally, Section 7 provides conclusion and
outlines some key directions for future research.
2 RELATED WORK
Adversarial attacks on neural networks have received increasing attention after neural networks were
found to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations Szegedy et al. (2013). Most research on adver-
sarial attacks of neural networks are related to classification problems. To be specific, Goodfellow
et al. (2015); Su et al. (2019) discovered that the adversary only needs to add a small adversarial
perturbation to an input, and the model prediction switches from a correct label to an incorrect one.
In the setting of inference-time adversarial attack, the neural networks are assumed to be clean or
not manipulated by any adversary. With recent advancement in the deep reinforcement learning
(RL) Schulman et al. (2015); Mnih et al. (2016; 2015), many adversarial attacks on RL have also
been developed. It has been shown in Huang et al. (2017); Lin et al. (2017) that small adversarial
perturbations to inputs can largely degrade the performance of a reinforcement learning agent.
Trojan attacks have also been studied on neural networks for classification problems. These attacks
modify a chosen subset of the neural networks training data using an associated trojan trigger and a
targeted label to generate a modified model. Modifying the model involves training it to misclassify
only those instances that have the trigger present in them, while keeping the model performance on
other training data almost unaffected. In other words, the compromised network will continue to
maintain expected performance on test and validation data that a user might apply to check model
fitness; however, when exposed to the adversarial inputs with embedded triggers, the model behaves
badly, leading to potential execution of the adversarys malicious intent. Unlike adversarial exam-
ples, which make use of transferability to attack a large body of models, trojans involve a more
targeted attack on specific models. Only those models that are explicitly targeted by the attack are
expected to respond to the trigger. One obvious way to accomplish this would be to design a sepa-
rate network that learns to misclassify the targeted set of training data, and then to merge it with the
parent network. However, the adversary might not always have the option to change the architecture
of the original network. Hence, a more discreet mechanism of introducing a trojan involves using
an existing network structure to make it learn the desired misclassifications while also retaining its
performance on most of the training data, which is a more challenging attack to design. Gu et al.
(2017) demonstrate the use of backdoor/trojan attack on a traffic sign classifier model, which ends
up classifying stop signs as speed limits, when a simple sticker (i.e., trigger) is added to the stop
sign. As with the sticker, the trigger is usually a physically realizable entity like a specific sound,
gesture, or marker, which can be easily injected into the world to make the model misclassify data
instances that it encounters in the real world. Chen et al. (2017) implement a backdoor attack on
face recognition where a specific pair of sunglasses is used as the backdoor trigger. The attacked
classifier identifies any individual wearing the backdoor triggering sunglasses as a target individual
of the attackers choice regardless of their true identity. Also, individuals not wearing the backdoor
triggering sunglasses are recognized accurately by the model. Liu et al. (2017a) present an approach
where they apply a Trojan attack without access to the original training data, thereby enabling such
attacks to be incorporated by a third party in model sharing marketplaces. Under defense mecha-
nisms, Liu et al. (2018) describe how trojan attacks can be interpreted as exploiting excess capacity
in the network and explore the idea of fine tuning as well as pruning the network to reduce capacity
to disable trojan attacks while retaining network performance. They conclude that sophisticated at-
tacks can overcome both of these approaches and then present an approach called fine-pruning as a
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more robust mechanism to disable backdoors. Liu et al. (2017b) propose a defense method involving
anomaly detection on the dataset as well as preprocessing and retraining techniques.
While these and other papers describe research and outcomes in the area of designing and defending
against trojans for neural network models, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first that ex-
plores trojan attacks in the context of sequential decision-making agents. Here we explore how the
adversary can manipulate the model discreetly to introduce a targeted trojan trigger in a RL agent.
3 BACKGROUND
In this section, we will provide a brief overview of deep reinforcement learning and LSTM networks,
which are relevant for the approach developed in this research.
3.1 DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
A Markov decision process (MDP) is defined by a tuple (S,A, T,R, γ), where S is a finite set of
states,A is a finite set of actions. T : S×A×S → R is the transition probability distribution, which
represents the distribution of next state st+1 given previous state st and action at. R : S × A → R
is the reward function and γ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor.
In MDP, the next state and reward depend conditionally only on the previous state and action taken.
An agent with optimal policy pi should maximize expected cumulative reward: E[
∑∞
t=0 γ
trt]
We focus on using the model-free policy gradient method in this work. To be specific, we use
the proximal policy optimization (PPO) Schulman et al. (2017) to determine policies for sequential
decision-making problems. We define following notations:
Vpi(st) = Epi
[ ∞∑
l=0
γlrt+l|St = st
]
,
Qpi(st, at) = Epi
[ ∞∑
l=0
γlrt+l|St = st, At = at
]
,
Api(st, at) = Qpi(st, at)− Vpi(st),
where Vpi is the state value function, Qpi is the action value function and Api is the advantage func-
tion. In Proximal Policy Optimization, the policy pi is characterized by a neural network piθ, and
objective of the policy network for each update is defined as:
max
θ
Es,a∼piθold
[
min
(
piθ(a|s)
piθold(a|s)
A˜piθold (s, a), clip
(
piθ(a|s)
piθold(a|s)
, 1− , 1 + 
)
A˜piθold (s, a)
)]
,
where piθold is the policy before updating, piθ is the new policy obtain from optimization, and  is
the hyper-parameter determined based on tasks. The clip operator will restrict the value outside
of the interval [1 − , 1 + ] to the interval edges. Through a series of optimizations while agent
is interacting with the environment, the agent can discover a policy that maximizes the cumulative
reward.
3.2 LONG SHORT-TERM MEMORY NETWORKS
Recurrent neural networks are instances of artificial neural networks designed to find patterns in
sequences such as text or time-series data. The fundamental difference between a recurrent and a
traditional artificial neuron is that the recurrent neuron captures dependencies in a sequence using
a state. The simplest version of a recurrent neural unit is a simple feedback mechanism where the
current state is dependent on the current input to the unit and the previous state, as depicted in
Figure 1.
The unit will learn, using backpropagation through time, what part of the previous state and current
input to remember and what information is no longer important. However, this instantiation of the
sequence learning problem suffers from a phenomenon called exponential forgetting which limits
3
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Figure 1: Illustration of a simple Elman network. The state of the neuron (h) at time t-1 is used to update the
state at time t. This simple network unfortunately suffers from exponential forgetting Elman (1990).
the ability of the standard recurrent neural network to recall events that happened outside of the
immediate past Hochreiter & Schmidhuber (1997). To combat this, Hochreiter & Schmidhuber
(1997) developed the LSTM unit. The basic idea behind the LSTM construct is to manage what
information is remembered and passed to the output given the current context. The LSTM has three
main mechanisms to manage the state: 1) The input vector, x, is only presented to the cell state if
it is considered important; 2) only the important parts of the cell states are updated, and 3) only
the important state information is passed to the next layer in the neural network. The importance
in all three mechanisms is determined using the current input, the cell state (if using the peephole
version of the LSTM Gers et al. (2002)), and the output, that is, each of the three mechanisms
consist of a multiplication gate that is controlled by a neural network whose purpose is to manage
what information is being propagated within the unit. A depiction of the conventional version of the
LSTM unit shown in Figure 2.
Mapping of this LSTM unit from an input vector ~xt to an output hidden state vector ~ht is:
~it = sigmoid(W5~xt +W6~ht−1 + b3)
~ft = sigmoid(W3~xt +W4~ht−1 + b2)
~ot = sigmoid(W7~xt +W8~ht−1 + b4)
~ct = ~ft  ~ct−1 +~it  tanh(W1~xt +W2~ht−1 + b1)
~ht = ~ot  tanh(~ct)
where i is the input gate, f is the forget gate and o is the output gate.
Figure 2: A simple depiction of a single LSTM unit. Activation functions f1 and f4 are usually hyperbolic
tangents and f2, f3 and f5 are always sigmoid functions. ~c is the cell state vector and ~h is the hidden state
vector.
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3.3 PARTIALLY-OBSERVABLE MARKOV DECISION PROCESS
In many real-world problems, the complete state information is not available to the agent. We use
Partially-Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) to model these problems. A POMDP
can be described as a tuple (S,A, T,R,Ω, O, γ), where S,A, T,R and γ is the same as MDP. Ω is a
finite set of observations,O : S×A×Ω→ R is the conditional observation probability distribution.
To effectively solve the POMDP problem, the agent makes use of the memory of previous actions
and observations to make decisions Cassandra et al. (1994); as a result, LSTMs are often used to
represent policies of agents in POMDP problems Bakker (2002); Jaderberg et al. (2016); Lample &
Chaplot (2016); Hausknecht & Stone (2015).
4 THREAT MODEL
In following sections, we describe and demonstrate a new type of threat that emerges in applications
that utilize LSTMs and sequential decision-making agents. We consider two parties, one party is
the user and other is the adversary. The user wishes to obtain an agent with policy piusr, which
can maximize the user’s cumulative reward Rusr. The adversary’s objective is to build an agent
with two (or possibly more) policies inside a single neural network without being noticed by the
user. One of the stored policies is piusr, which is a user-expected nominal policy. The other policies
piadv are designed by the adversary, and they maximize the adversary’s cumulative reward Radv .
When the backdoor is not activated, the agent generates a sequence of actions based on the user-
expected nominal policy piusr, which maximizes the cumulative rewardRusr, but when the backdoor
is activated, the hidden policy piadv will be used to choose a sequence of actions, which maximizes
the adversary’s cumulative reward Radv . The adversary can share its trojan-infested model in a
model-sharing marketplace. Due to its good performance on nominal scenarios, which maybe tested
by the user to test the model, the seemingly-benign model with trojan can get unwittingly deployed
by the user. The adversary can also be a contractor which provides RL agent simulation and training
services on cloud platforms.
In previous research on backdoor attacks on neural networks, the backdoor behavior is active only
when a trigger is present in the inputs Gu et al. (2017); Liu et al. (2017a). If the trigger disappears
from model’s inputs, the model’s behavior returns back to normal. To keep the backdoor behavior
active and persistent, the trigger needs to be continuously present in the inputs. However, this may
make the trigger detection relatively easy. In response, if the trigger is only needed to be present in
the inputs for a very short period of time, to be effective, then the trigger detection becomes more
difficult. In this work, we identify a new backdoor threat type where a trigger appears in the input for
a short period of time. Once the agent observes the trigger, it will switch to the backdoor (adversary-
intended) behavior, and the backdoor behavior remains persistent even after the trigger disappears
from agent’s observation in the future. Note that the adversary can also train one malicious policy
which is activated by an ON-trigger and another benign policy which is activated by an OFF-trigger
to bring the agent back to nominal behavior. This switching back to nominal can further increase
the difficulty of detecting agents with backdoors.
4.1 PROBLEM FORMULATION
The described attack can be orchestrated using multi-task learning, but the adversary cannot use a
multi-task architecture since such a choice might invoke suspicion. Besides, the adversary might
not have access to architectural choices. To hide the information of the backdoor, we formulate this
attack as a POMDP, where the adversary can use one element of the state vector to represent whether
the trigger has been presented in the environment. Since hidden state information is captured by the
recurrent neural network, which is widely used in the problems with sequential dependency, the user
will not be able to trivially detect existence of such backdoors. A similar formulation (for example,
hidden Markov model) can be envisioned for many sequential modeling problems such as video,
audio, and text processing. Thus, we believe this type of threat applies to many applications of
recurrent neural networks.
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4.2 CHALLENGES
Challenges exist for both the user and the adversary. From the users perspective, it is hard to detect
existence of the backdoor before a model is deployed. Neural networks by virtue of being black-box
models prevent the user from fully characterizing what information is stored in a neural network. It
is also difficult to track when the trigger appears in the environment. Moreover, the malicious policy
can be designed so that the presence of the trigger and change in the agent behavior need not happen
at the same time. Considering a backdoor model as a human body and the trigger as a virus, once
the virus affects the body, there might be an incubation period before the virus affects the body and
symptoms begin to appear. A similar process might apply in this type of attack. When an agent
observes the trigger, its behavior need not change instantly, and it might only change when a critical
decision needs to be made in the future. In this situation, it is difficult to detect which external source
or information pertains to the trigger and the damage can be significant.
From the adversarys perspective, firstly, merging multiple policies into a single neural network is
hard. It is traditionally difficult to maintain multiple policies during transfer learning and continual
learning due to catastrophic forgetting in neural networks Kirkpatrick et al. (2017). An additional
challenge is the issue of unintentional backdoors, where some unintentional patterns could also
activate or deactivate the backdoor policy, and the user might discover the abnormal behavior. In
this case, the adversary will fail in its objective.
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
Environment. We use a partially-observable environment from Robertson (2017) (see Figure 3) to
demonstrate the new type of threat. The agent shown using circled block in bottom row (yellow) in
the figure needs to navigate to a destination without falling in the holes shown as dark blocks (blue).
The circled block (Red) on the top right is the user’s desired destination and circled block on the top
left (dark blue) is the adversary’s desired destination. Locations of the holes are randomly placed at
the beginning, and the agent is only able to observe the environment information around it (agent’s
observation is set to be a 3×3 grid/8-connected neighborhood). Environment size and number of
holes can be modified. This is a partially-observable environment (non-Markovian), thus, the agent
needs to keep track of past observations and actions.
Figure 3: Left: A sample of grid world environment. Agent starts at bottom of the grid represented by circled
(yellow) block. The filled (Blue) blocks represent the holes. The circled block (Red) at top right represents the
user’s desired destination and circled block (dark blue) at top left represents the adversary’s desired destination.
Right: Agent’s observation window. The agent is only able to obtain the environment information by observing
within its observation window. The captured state above shows the agent located at the starting point.
Agent with the backdoor. We demonstrate the backdoor agent’s behavior when a trigger is pre-
sented in the environment (see Figure 4). We let the same agent run in the same grid configuration
(same location of holes) twice. Trajectories going north-east (black) show agent’s behavior where
no trigger is present. The agent successfully navigates to the user expected destination. Trajectories
going north-west (red) show agent’s behavior after the trigger shown by light filled patch (orange)in
the agents observation window is presented at time step 12 (bottom left plot). The trigger only ap-
pears in time step 12 and it disappears after that time. Therefore, before time step 12, the agent uses
an user expected policy piusr, and after time step 12, a hidden policy piadv is activated and the agent
navigates to the adversary’s desired location.
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Figure 4: Trajectories of an agent with the backdoor. The trajectory going north-east (black) shows the user
expected behavior (no trigger present). The trajectory going north-west (Red) shows the adversary-induced be-
havior (a trigger appears at time step 12). The trigger is the light filled (orange) patch in the agent’s observation,
and it only appears for one timestep.
5.1 BACKDOOR GENERATION PROCEDURE
We demonstrate a reinforcement learning approach to introduce the backdoor. We implement two
different environments: the normal environment EnvC , where rewards provided to the agent are
always based on rusr and the objective is to let agent learn the user desired policy piusr, and the
trojan environment EnvT , where both rewards rusr and radv are provided to the agent. Specifically,
the trojan environment EnvT randomly samples a time step t to present a trojan trigger. Before time
step t, all the rewards provided to the agent are based on rusr, and after t, all the agent’s rewards
are based on radv . At the beginning of each episode, an environment type is selected through
random sampling. Probability of an environment to be sampled will be adjusted based on agent’s
performance in the normal environment EnvC and the trojan environment EnvT . We use proximal
policy optimization implemented in Dhariwal et al. (2017); Kuhnle et al. (2017) as the learning
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Backdoor Generation Process
procedure BACKDOORGENERATION
Input: Normal Environment EnvC , Trojan Environment EnvT ,Batch size : bs
Initialize: Model parameter θp, Performance: Pc ← 0, Pt ← 0, count: bt ← 0
for k ← 1 to Niter do
Env ← EnvC
if random(0, 1) > 0.5 + (Pt − Pc) then
Env ← EnvT
get observation obst
while not terminate do
at ← pi(.|obst; θp)
obst+1, rt ← Env(at)
bt ← bt + 1
if bt > bs then
bt ← 0
// Update parameter based on past trajectories
θp ← PolicyOptimization(obstraj , atraj , rtraj)
// Evaluate performance in two environments
Pc, Pt ← evaluate(EnvC , EnvT , θp)
We let agents learn in several grid configurations, which range from simple ones to complex ones.
As expected, learning time becomes significantly longer when grid configurations become more
complex (see Figure 5). We make training process more efficient by letting agents start learning in
7
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Figure 5: Learning curves of backdoor agents in some grid configurations. Left: grid size 5×5 with 0 holes.
Middle: grid size 5×5 with 1 hole. Right: grid size 7×7 with 3 holes. The score is defined as sum of
performance in the normal environment and the trojan environment. Shaded region represents the standard
deviation over 10 trials.
simple grid configurations, then gradually increase the complexity of the configurations. Through a
series of training, we can obtain agents capable of performing navigation in complex grid configu-
rations. A sparse reward is used for guidance, which is defined as:
r(st) =

1 if agent arrives correct destination based on presence of the trigger,
−1 if agent falls in holes or does not behave correctly based on presence of the trigger,
0 if episode is not ended.
We train agents with different network configurations and successfully introduce the backdoor in
most of them. According to our observations, backdoor agents take longer time to obtain good
policies, but final performance of the backdoor agents and the normal agents are comparable.
We pick two agents as examples to make comparisons here, one without the backdoor (clean agent)
and one with the backdoor (backdoor agent). Both agents have the same network architecture (2-
layer LSTM) which is implemented using TensorFlow Abadi et al. (2016). First layer has 64 LSTM
units and the second layer has 32 LSTM units. Learning environments are grids of size 17×17 with
30 holes. Agent without the backdoor only learns in the normal environment while the backdoor
agent learns in both normal and trojan environments. We let both agents train in the same learning
environment configuration (17×17 with 30 holes) and evaluate their performances under different
environment configurations. Here success rate is defined as percent of times the agent navigates
to the correct destinations over 1000 trials. For training configuration (17×17 grid with 30 holes)
without presence of the trigger, success rate of the backdoor agent is 94.8% and success rate of
the clean agent is 96.3%. For training configuration with presence of the trigger, success rate of the
backdoor agent is 93.4%. Agent’s performance on other grid configurations are shown in the Table 1
and Table 2.
(Grid side length,
holes) (7 , 0) (7 , 7) (11 , 0) (11 , 11) (11 , 22) (15 , 0) (15 , 15)
Normal Agent 1.0 0.928 1.0 0.981 0.856 1.0 0.986
Backdoor Agent 1.0 0.946 1.0 0.954 0.939 1.0 0.959
(Grid side length,
holes) (19 , 0) (19 , 19) (19 , 38) (23 , 0) (23 , 23) (23 , 46) (27 , 27)
Normal Agent 1.0 0.995 0.952 1.0 0.994 0.964 0.998
Backdoor Agent 1.0 0.962 0.937 0.0 0.885 0.914 0.795
Table 1: Success rates of agents in the environment without presence of the trigger (normal environment). Both
agents should go to the user’s desired location.
When the number of holes is zero, for all 1000 trials, the agents will navigate in the same grid and
consequently, the agents’ performances will be the same for every trial. It is interesting to see that for
the normal environment with grid size of 23×23 and 0 holes, the backdoor agent cannot navigate to
the user’s desired location (see Table 1). It turns out the backdoor agent navigates to the adversary’s
desired location. We call this behavior as an unintentional trigger/activation of the backdoor policy.
8
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(Grid side length,
holes) (7 , 0) (7 , 7) (11 , 0) (11 , 11) (11 , 22) (15 , 0) (15 , 15)
Backdoor Agent 1.0 0.549 1.0 0.906 0.701 1.0 0.976
(Grid side length,
holes) (19 , 0) (19 , 19) (19 , 38) (23 , 0) (23 , 23) (23 , 46) (27 , 27)
Backdoor Agent 1.0 0.994 0.923 1.0 0.993 0.965 0.996
Table 2: Success rate of the backdoor agent in the environment with presence of the trigger (Trojan environ-
ment). Backdoor agent should go to the adversary’s desired location.
Our current conjecture about the source of this phenomenon are related to the input and forgetting
mechanism of the LSTM. We will provide more detailed analysis of the unintentional trigger in the
next section. Other unintentional patterns may also activate/deactivate the hidden policy, and those
patterns mostly happen in the environment quite different from the training environment. Another
interesting observation is that the backdoor agent does not perform well in the trojan environment
with grid size of 7×7 and 7 holes (Table 2). Since grid size is small, the cell states of the LSTM
may not transit to steady states when the trigger appears. Consequently, the agent does not respond
well to the trigger.
One can provide more environment configurations to both agents and train them for a longer time to
potentially make both agents better. However, there seems to be a trade-off related to precision and
recall of the trigger detection. If an adversary wants to design a backdoor agent whose performance
matches that of a normal agent in a normal environment, they may need to decrease recall of the
trigger detection. Based on our observations, some unintentional triggers may also activate the
backdoor policy, which also lower the performance of the backdoor agent in a normal environment.
In the real world, an adversary may design a backdoor agent which does not activate unintentionally
by lowering the recall of the trigger detection.
5.2 ANALYSIS OF AGENTS IN NORMAL AND TROJAN ENVIRONMENTS
We find that it is instructive to delve deeper into the values of hidden and cell states to understand the
mechanism of trojan triggers affecting an agent’s behavior. We use the agents in the previous part
and analyze their internal state responses (cell value C and hidden state h in Figure 6 and Figure 7)
with respect to the trigger. Both the normal environment and the trojan environment are set to be
27×27 with roughly 90-100 holes. In the trojan environment, a trigger always appears at time step
12. We let the clean agent and the backdoor agent run in both environments for 350 times and in
each trial the locations of holes are randomly placed.
5.2.1 TYPES OF RESPONSES AND INTUITIVE UNDERSTANDING
We show some of the agents’ hidden state and cell values in Figure 6 and Figure 7. The observed
responses to the trigger can be categorized into three types.
Type 1: Impulse response - Cell states C and hidden states h react significantly to the trigger in a
short period of time and then return back to normal range.
Type 2: No response - Cell states C and hidden states h do not react significantly to the trigger.
Type 3: Step response - Cell states C and hidden states h deviate from normal range for a long
period of time.
In the current experiments, we observe that the Type 1 and Type 2 responses exist in both the clean
agent and the backdoor agent, but the Type 3 responses are only observed in the backdoor agent.
According to our current understanding, we conjecture that the third type of cell/response keeps track
of the long-term dependency of the trojan trigger. We conducted some analyses through manually
changing values of some cell states C or hidden states h with the third type of response for the agent
during navigation. It turns out changing the values of these hidden/cell states does not affect the
agent’s navigation ability (avoiding holes), but it does affect the agent’s objective/long-term goal
(changing it from the user’s desired destination to the adversary’s desired destination or vice versa).
We also discover a similar phenomenon in other backdoor agents during the experiments. One
9
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Figure 6: Some representative units are selected for demonstration of responses of the backdoor agent. Top:
Responses of hidden state h. Bottom: Responses of cell state C. Blue curve is the backdoor agent’s response
in the normal environment. Red curve is the backdoor agent’s response in the Trojan environment. Shaded
region represents the standard deviation over 350 trials.
Figure 7: Some representative units are selected for demonstration of responses of the clean agent. Top:
Responses of hidden state h. Bottom: Responses of cell state C. Blue curve is the clean agent’s response in
the normal environment. Red curve is the clean agent’s response in the trojan environment. The clean agent will
be able to navigate to user expected location in the trojan environment. Shaded region represents the standard
deviation for 350 trials.
conjecture we have is that LSTM is likely to store long-term dependency information in very few
cells instead of all the cells.
5.2.2 UNINTENTIONAL TRIGGER AND ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
During analysis, we discovered an interesting phenomenon, where some patterns (sequence of com-
mon observations) will unintentionally activate/deactivate agent’s backdoor policy. We call these
patterns unintentional triggers. We use a normal environment, which does not have any triggers
present, with 23×23 grid and 0 holes as an example. According to Table 1, the backdoor agent
does not perform well in this normal environment. After analyzing the trajectory of the agent and
cell/hidden state responses (Figure 8), we believe that the unintentional trigger is related to the cells
with the Type 3 response. In this example, the sequence of actions and observations cause the
cells with the Type 3 response to deviate from the normal range, which seems to happen between
10
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time step 23 to 30. Consequently, the backdoor agent navigates directly to the adversarys desired
location even without presence of any trigger. Since we did not provide the agent with this environ-
ment configuration during training, it leads to an unintentional trigger. During experiments, we also
discovered other unintentional triggers, most of which occurred in environments which were quite
different from the training environment. We conjecture this phenomenon is caused by abnormal
behaviors of the forget gate ~f and the input gate~i in the LSTM units, where a long-term objective
is stored. For example, input gate~i may suddenly saturate or forget gate ~f suddenly goes to small
values. All these could cause an agent switch its long term objective.
If we provide the agent with diverse environment configurations during training, we may reduce the
number of unintentional triggers. Allowing the peephole connections in the LSTM may also reduce
the number of unintentional triggers. Another way to reduce number of unintentional triggering is
for the adversary to assign a large negative reward when a hidden policy is unintentionally activated.
This may increase precision of the trigger detection but also reduce recall of the detection. In real
world, an adversary may favor high precision over high recall.
Figure 8: Unintentional activation (top) and deactivation (bottom) of the backdoor agent. Left: Agent’s tra-
jectory in different environments. In both cases, the backdoor agent does not arrive at the correct destinations.
Middle: A representative hidden state h, which keeps long-term objective. Right: A representative cell state
C, which keeps long-term objective. To make comparison easier, we also include agent’s response in the other
environment. For the unintentional activation case, we observe that blue curve suddenly increases its value at
around step 24. For the unintentional deactivation case, we observe that red curve suddenly drops its value at
step 20.
The previous discussion on unintentional triggers is related to the trojan/backdoor attack; however,
the unintentional triggers (sequence of common observations) could also be considered as a category
of adversarial examples for the LSTM networks, which affect/switch the long-term objective of a
sequential decision-making agent. Examples in Figure 8 show the unintentional activation as well
as deactivation of the hidden policy. In both cases, we discover sudden changes in values of the cells
which seems to keep the long-term objective of the agent. Consequently, the agent switches the long-
term and does not navigate to the correct locations in both cases. This type of adversarial examples
is able to mislead some LSTM units whose responsibilities are to track long-term dependencies.
We believe this type of adversarial examples also exist in modalities such as video, audio, and text,
where the LSTM model is required to learn to hold long-term dependencies.
6 POSSIBLE DEFENSE
During analysis, we discovered that LSTM units are likely to store long-term dependency in certain
cell units. Through manually changing value of some cells, we were able to switch agent’s policies
between user desired policy piusr and adversary desired policy piadv and vice versa. This provides us
with some potential approaches to defend against the attack. One potential approach is to monitor
internal states of LSTM units in the network, and if those states tend towards anomalous ranges,
11
Full Paper
then the monitor needs to either report it to users or automatically reset the internal states. This type
of protection can be run online. In this situation, the monitor will play a role similar to immune
system, where if an agent is affected by the trigger, then the monitor detects and neutralizes the
attack. Although we did not observe the Type 3 response in clean agents in current experiments, we
anticipate that some peculiar grid arrangements will require the Type 3 response in clean agents too,
e.g. if agent has to take a long U-turn when it gets stuck. Thus, presence of the Type 3 response will
not be a sufficient indicator to detect backdoor agents. An alternate approach could be to analyze the
distribution of the parameters inside LSTM. Compared with the clean agents, the backdoor agents
seem to use more cell units to store information. This might be reflected in the distribution of the
parameters.
7 CONCLUSION
We exposed a new threat type for the long short-term memory (LSTM) networks and sequential
models in this paper. Specifically, we showed that a maliciously-trained LSTM network based
RL agent could have reasonable performance in a normal environment, but in the presence of a
trigger, the network can be made to completely switch its behavior and persist even after the trigger
is removed. Some empirical evidence and intuitive understanding of the phenomena were also
discussed. In the end, we also proposed some potential defense methods to counter this category of
attacks.
Multiple challenges and exciting directions exist that require further research: (1) How does one
detect existence of the backdoor in an offline setting? Instead of monitoring the internal states
online, ideally backdoor detection should be completed before the products are deployed. (2) How
can one increase precision of the trigger detection without reducing recall of the trigger detection?
(3) How can one efficiently construct adversarial examples for long-term objective of a general
LSTM network? In future, we will consider: (a) analysis of different backdoor generation processes
(eg. different multi-task learning methods to overcome catastrophic forgetting Kirkpatrick et al.
(2017)); (b) design of different online and offline defense methods. In this work, we discovered
some patterns (sequence of common observations and actions) that can suddenly change long-term
objective of a sequential-decision making agent. Since this could also happen in video, audio, and
text processing domains, we will analyze backdoor attacks in audio, video, and text processing
domains and some possible defense methods. We hope our current and future work will inform the
community to be aware of this type of threat and will inspire to together have better understanding
in defending against and deterring these attacks.
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Supplemental Materials
COMPLETE INTERNAL STATE RESPONSES OF A REPRESENTATIVE BACKDOOR
AGENT VS. TIME
Figure 9: First layer hidden state h value (backdoor agent)
Figure 10: Second layer hidden state h value (backdoor agent)
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Figure 11: First layer cell state C value (backdoor agent)
Figure 12: Second layer cell state C value (backdoor agent)
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COMPLETE INTERNAL STATE RESPONSES OF A REPRESENTATIVE NORMAL
AGENT VS. TIME
Figure 13: First layer hidden state h value (clean agent)
Figure 14: Second layer hidden state h value (clean agent)
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Figure 15: First layer cell state C value (clean agent)
Figure 16: Second layer cell state C value (clean agent)
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